Perhaps no word better captures the state of governance in Guyana today than ad hocism—the tendency to respond to problems only after they have become crises rather than anticipating and preventing them. It is a style of governance characterised by improvisation instead of planning, reaction instead of foresight, and repetition instead of reform.
For a government that has occupied the political landscape for well over twenty-five years, one would have expected that the People’s Progressive Party had internalised institutional memory, experience and accumulated expertise that would have translated into efficient public administration. Instead, too many national programmes continue to suffer from the same predictable shortcomings. Three recent examples illustrate this troubling pattern.
The first is the Cash Grant Programme.
After the administrative confusion surrounding the 2024–2025 distribution exercise, many Guyanese reasonably expected that the government would have conducted a comprehensive review, retained the successful aspects of the programme and corrected its obvious weaknesses. That is what competent governance requires. Instead, the 2026 rollout became a near replica of its predecessor.
To be fair, one improvement deserves recognition—the inclusion of beneficiaries’ banking information to facilitate electronic payments. Beyond that, however, little appeared to have changed. Hinterland residents, rural communities, unemployed school leavers, participants in the informal economy and many other eligible citizens once again found themselves waiting while being repeatedly assured that their cheques would “soon be ready.”
What makes this situation even more perplexing is the political messaging surrounding the programme. During the 2025 election campaign, President Irfaan Ali promised another cash grant before subsequently reducing the proposed amount. Following the elections, he questioned the long-term sustainability of cash grants altogether, despite having encouraged citizens only a year earlier to use the grants to “build intergenerational wealth.” Public criticism eventually forced the programme forward, yet many of its administrative deficiencies remained intact. It is therefore unsurprising that some hinterland communities were still being registered for grants in June 2026—months after the national exercise had officially begun.
The second example is traffic management.
Road fatalities have become an almost routine feature of national headlines, yet meaningful policy intervention remains largely absent. Recent days have witnessed another disturbing increase in serious accidents, many occurring during the height of Guyana’s rainy season.
Official explanations often cite wet roads or driver error. While those factors undoubtedly contribute, they fail to address the larger issue. Every licensed driver, it is assumed, understands the risks associated with driving in adverse weather. Equally, overtaking on rain-soaked roads is rarely justifiable. The more uncomfortable truth is that many motorists have become accustomed to weak enforcement, inconsistent policing and an absence of meaningful deterrence. When the likelihood of punishment is perceived as minimal, reckless behaviour inevitably flourishes. As our Trinidadian neighbours might describe it, the result is a continual “traffic bacchanal” on Guyana’s roads.
The third example is seasonal flooding.
Every year, Guyanese brace themselves for the rainy season with a growing sense of inevitability. The May–June 2026 rains again left Georgetown, rural communities, sections of the Rupununi and Region Ten under water. In some regions rivers overtopped their banks, farms were inundated, homes were damaged and livelihoods disrupted.
Rainfall itself is not the problem. Heavy rainfall has always been part of Guyana’s climate. The real issue is government’s inability—or unwillingness—to prepare adequately for its predictable consequences. Poor drainage maintenance, blocked canals, inadequate urban planning, weak enforcement of environmental regulations and years of deferred infrastructure investment have transformed seasonal rains into recurring national emergencies. Nature may provide the rainfall, but the decisions by this government quite often determine the scale of the disaster.
These examples are connected by a common thread. They reveal a governing philosophy that too often responds to events rather than preparing for them. Lessons are identified but seldom institutionalised. Mistakes are acknowledged but rarely corrected. Programmes are relaunched with cosmetic adjustments while their structural weaknesses remain untouched.
Good governance is not measured by the number of initiatives announced or the volume of money spent. It is measured by the ability to learn, adapt and improve. Guyana today possesses financial resources that previous generations could scarcely have imagined. Yet it seems that this prosperity has not convinced this government to guarantee competent administration. Without effective planning, strong institutions and a commitment to continuous improvement, we may find this government finding itself repeatedly solving the same problems.
Ad hocism is not merely an administrative inconvenience; it can now be considered a PPP governance culture. And until that culture gives way to strategic planning, institutional learning and evidence-based policymaking, this government risks Guyana remaining trapped in a cycle where every new initiative is treated as though it were being attempted for the first time. Guyanese deserve governance that anticipates challenges rather than simply reacting to them after the damage has already been done.
Discussion