I refer to your editorial of Sunday 21st instant on the subject at caption, which heralds the candidacy for the post of United Nations Secretary General (UNSG) of Guyana’s Ambassador to the United Nations Ms. Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett as ‘a source of national pride’, and deservedly so; indeed, from all reports, Ambassador Rodrigues-Birkett’s colleagues in the UN have come to know her as an accomplished diplomat. In addition, the editorial makes the point that ‘[C]andidates are judged not only by their personal records but also by the foreign policy stature of the states that nominate them’. In this regard, the candidacy as a whole could be regarded as a “known unknown”.
Coming relatively late in the day – the election to replace the incumbent on 1 January 2027 is imminent – Guyana has not had the recent experience of mounting a comparable diplomatic campaign since the last century. The elections for a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) which Guyana attained in 2023 have over the years become orderly affairs among members of our GRULAC regional group, with countries putting forward their candidature decades in advance, so that they are uncontested – in Guyana’s case the candidature had been put forward during the term of President Donald Ramotar. More recently, Trinidad and Tobago’s election was also uncontested.
Across the pond in Brussels, Guyana in 2014 mounted a successful campaign to elect its Ambassador Dr. Patrick I. Gomes, resident in Belgium for almost ten preceding years, as ACP Secretary General. That post, like that of the UNSG, is also shared among the six regional groups in the ACP (now OACPS); however, it is a less challenging campaign, especially as in the rotation, Ambassador Gomes would have assured the other regional groups of a place within the Secretariat’s Executive Management, all of which change in every five-year cycle.
Ambassador Rodrigues-Birkett would have no comparable flexibility regarding the allocation of Executive positions within the UN Secretariat, although she could, for example, personally appoint Special Rapporteurs and Special Envoys, were she to be successful in the election.
In so far as it concerns campaigns in the UN system, Guyana had in the 1980’s set itself the formidable task of seeking the election of then Vice-President and Attorney General Dr. Mohamed Shahabuddeen to a seat on the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
It was therefore with a mix of pride and humility that I left the office of then Foreign Minister, the late Rashleigh Jackson’s office one evening after he had summoned me to advise that he had issued instructions for me to travel to New York to join the campaign for Dr. Shahabuddeen’s election. To paraphrase his words, “Sometimes a new face can make a difference”.
But, I tell a lie: as the departure date grew closer, another emotion – trepidation – set in, as I began to come to terms with the magnitude of the task and the burden that had been placed on me: while I was going to join my colleagues already engaged in the campaign in New York – the late Ambassadors Rudy Insanally and David Karran, along with Rawle Lucas, the late Elaine Jacob and Earl Manget – I was to be Guyana’s representative in the Sixth (Legal) Committee. Here I would be tasked with anchoring the campaign as it were, as this was the Committee whose membership would invariably be the persons to recommend support to their capitals for the various candidates for the post of Judge of the ICJ.
Guyana was under no illusion as to what it had set out to achieve: the election of a candidate as the first English-speaking judge from GRULAC, relatively unknown in UN legal circles, seeking to replace the powerful Brazilian incumbent and alongside another CARICOM candidate from Jamaica.
Foreign Minister Jackson had assumed the role of Campaign Manager, drawing from his extensive experience and contacts both as former Permanent Representative in New York and as Foreign Minister. From Georgetown, he had mapped out a careful sequence of events, using the methodological approach of his mathematical training, which then culminated in his Chairing a strategy session well into a Sunday night at the Ambassador’s residence in the suburbs of New York.
That strategy included a number of features: targeting of selected groups such as the Commonwealth, the membership of which all shared with Guyana the British Common Law tradition; the Non-Aligned Movement, where Guyana had made a name for itself and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, which could readily align with our Muslim candidate.
Another feature was the decision for the late Ambassador Noel Sinclair to return to New York, he having been replaced by Ambassador Insanally earlier in 1987. It was indeed remarkable to observe the esteem with which Ambassador Sinclair was held, as he walked through the corridors of the UN, being greeted on his return by both Ambassadors and senior Secretariat staff alike, switching effortlessly as he did so through three of the six official languages of the UN – English, Spanish and French. The totality of his presence was of immense value to our campaign.
Lastly, it was decided that we introduce the candidate himself to key Ambassadors and groups in New York a few weeks before the election, just as delegations would have been finalizing their recommendations to capitals. Of course Dr. Shahabuddeen acquitted himself well – as the French would say, ca va sans dire!
For my part, I set about trying to “make a difference” in the Sixth Committee by ensuring that Guyana’s voice was heard on the various agenda items and endearing myself to my colleagues in order to canvass our candidate, targeting key Members in Africa, the Pacific and the OIC.
As indicated previously, Dr. Shahabuddeen was seen in some quarters as an unknown quantity. Whereas he was known internationally for his attendance at meetings of Commonwealth Law Ministers and the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, he had not trodden the route of choice for ascendancy to the ICJ, namely by attending meetings of the Sixth Committee and attaining membership of the prestigious UN International Law Commission.
The task fell to the delegation through hard diplomatic leg work and indeed to the candidate when he turned up in New York, to dispel that viewpoint. It was not always easy going: in one case, I was taken to lunch by two colleagues from the Secretariat and asked that Guyana withdraw its candidate. In response I thanked them for lunch and, in my best diplomatic language, told them to go to hell!
A week before the election, I met my Brazilian colleague at a reception and enquired about their campaign. I asked if his candidate was still in town and somewhat flippantly, he said that he had already returned to capital. We subsequently discovered that that was to prove fatal to Brazil’s candidate, as some Members told us that Brazil never came a-calling for their support, which was regarded as a show of disrespect.
On the day of the election, the balloting commenced at ten o’clock in the morning and we did not rise until ten that night. To be elected to the ICJ, candidates have to get a majority in both the UNSC and the UNGA. While in the first round in the UNSC, the Brazilian candidate amassed 1o votes to Dr Shahabuddeen’s 5, our candidate amassed the majority in the UNGA. As the day progressed, so too did Dr. Shahabuddeen’s lead in the UNGA; the Jamaican candidate was a distant third.
On the second ballot in the UNSC, the Brazilian fell to an 8-7 lead, as the higher body reacted to the groundswell of steadily increasing support for Dr. Shahabuddeen. With the reality hitting home, Brazil attempted to apply pressure so that the vote could be deferred, no doubt to give itself time to work the phones and reach out to capitals to influence the vote in its favour.
It is here that the Guyana delegation was able to use its diplomatic reach to the fullest: as he worked the floor of the UNGA to garner support in favor of proceeding with the election, Ambassador Sinclair asked me to identify some Sixth Committee colleagues to speak on our behalf. I chose a colleague from Africa that was currently also on the UNSC, that I was aware was supporting our candidate and another outspoken Ambassador from the Pacific region. Using my personal contacts to good advantage, I prevailed upon the then Permanent Representative of Barbados, Dame Nita Barrow, an old friend of my dearly departed mother; Dame Nita readily agreed. The coup de grace came when I suggested to Ambassador Insanally that he ask Jamaica to speak on our behalf – what our candidate referred to at a celebration dinner the next evening as a “master stroke”. The Jamaican Ambassador also readily agreed and this was taken as a clear sign that CARICOM was now united behind Guyana’s candidate. With the chorus building from the floor for the vote to continue, the President of the UNGA responded favourably, the election proceeded and Dr. Shahabuddeen eventually secured an 11-4 majority in the UNSC. Victory!
Although the election of the UNSG could in reality be won or lost in the UNSC, a careful diplomatic campaign is still required by both the candidate and the country, to avoid the disrespect that Brazil was accused of by some in 1987. The reality is that while this current campaign is centered in New York, it also has to be carried out in capitals where Guyana maintains resident Missions. Alas, most of our Missions are headed by political appointees or staff who are not possessed of the “gravitas” needed to conduct a campaign of this magnitude.
Some time after the successful election of Judge Shahabuddeen, I was having a private conversation with the late Dr. Lennox Ballah, a senior diplomat and jurist from Trinidad and Tobago. In reflecting on our campaign, he remarked that “Guyana’s political odor at the time was such that the international community acquiesced in our request”. Circling back to what your editorial said about both the candidate and the country, I can only hope that Guyana’s political odor is as fresh and rosy as it was in 1987.
Best wishes for a successful candidature!
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