It could be said that the career of Robert Corbin straddled two important eras in Guyana’s post-Independence history. The first consisted largely of the establishment and consolidation of authoritarian rule coupled with economic decline. The second consisted largely of the establishment and consolidation of democratic rule coupled with economic growth. Corbin made his mark in both eras. He was actively engaged in supporting the former and made an important impact on the latter.
The failure to achieve a political solution after 1992, which was on Cheddi Jagan’s and the PPP’s agenda since 1978 with its adoption of proposals for a National Patriotic Front Government, was not only the PPP’s fault. It was also the PNC’s fault. Desmond Hoyte’s PNC had time only for political supremacy, not political solution, and demonstrated its policy in the streets with ‘slow fire, mo’ fire.’ No one in the PPP envisioned an approach to the PNC in those circumstances or if one did, imagined that such an approach would be entertained for more than a minute.
Corbin assumed the leadership of the PNC just one year after Hoyte announced that he was finally convinced that the time for ‘shared governance’ had arrived. But shortly before, in 2001, Bharrat Jagdeo had won the elections. At around the same period, therefore, new leaders had assumed office. The talks between Hoyte and Jagdeo in 2001 having failed, Corbin and Jagdeo made another effort. In 2004, agreement was reached featuring the following issues: Constitutional and Anti-Defection legislation; Commitments to Linden; Local Government and Reform Dialogues; and State Media Access and Dialogue. Within a few months this attempt at dialogue was ended by the PPP, for a reason or reasons unknown.
Corbin turned his attention to building a coalition for the elections. He appears to have understood that the PNC badly needed an alliance of forces. He came up with an outfit of one-person parties which he named PNCR-1G. He faced the 2006 elections having failed to establish a viable coalition, significant opposition to his leadership within the PNC and the newly formed AFC. The PNC obtained five seats less than in 2001. The AFC won five seats. Recognising that he might not be able to overcome internal opposition to his leadership and that the AFC posed a danger, he called in David Granger. APNU, with the WPA being the main junior partner, was established. In 2011, the new opposition party, APNU, recovered the votes and seats that the PNC had lost. The AFC gained, taking away support from the PPP, which dropped to minority status.
APNU+AFC, an electoral coalition, won the elections in 2015 but its government failed to implement constitutional reform for shared governance which had been promised in its manifesto. Having lost the elections in 2020 and there being no constitutional reform for shared governance in place, APNU lost out completely.
It appears that at this point Corbin lost whatever influence he may have still had. An internal critic, Aubrey Norton, won the leadership and his allies swept away the entire frontline leadership, ditched the AFC, went alone to the elections, and was crushed by WIN. APNU dropped from 31 seats in the National Assembly to 12. WIN won 16 seats. PPP/C obtained 36.
Shared governance had always been premised on the PNC being the second largest party with the objective being to reduce ethnic tension and competition at election time and generally in the society. Not only did no one expect the massive loss that APNU suffered but no one expected a large-scale migration of African Guyanese support to an Indian Guyanese-led party, WIN. For reasons other than the ethnic factor, such as the possibility that WIN could potentially draw away PPP/C supporters, shared governance is no longer an option for the PPP.
What does the future hold? APNU might make a comeback as it did in 2011. The PPP/C would be happy with such an outcome. It would remove the threat of WIN potentially winning the elections by its Indian leader taking away Indian votes. And the PPP knows that without APNU having a viable coalition partner that can draw votes away from the PPP, which APNU does not have, APNU cannot win elections. It is not likely that WIN will be that partner. In the meantime, while the capacity of the government to deliver benefits to the population because of Guyana’s growing oil income continues, there are clouds on the horizon, namely, the slow trickling down of benefits, the high cost of living and allegations of corruption. Whether the PPP/C can keep WIN at bay in these circumstances is not known. Failing to pay attention to gathering clouds on the horizon in 2006-2011 caused the PPP/C to lose its majority support in 2011 and the elections in 2015.
Is this a time for overtures to the APNU? Apart from the fact that it is always helpful to be on good terms, as far as is possible, with your adversaries in politics, good relations with APNU will assist in isolating WIN. If APNU is seen to be “gaining concessions” from the government which will benefit its supporters, maybe it will regain some lost ground at the expense of WIN. The recent discussions between APNU and WIN did not appear to bear much fruit. For the PPP to take on two opponents simultaneously would not seem to be the best course when one could be susceptible to an approach.
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