In Elie Wiesel’s Night, a biography of his childhood experiences in a Nazi concentration camp, a resident, Moishe the Beadle, returns to the Jewish community of Sighet bearing testimony of the Nazi atrocities from which he narrowly escaped. Having witnessed the execution of fellow deportees by Nazi forces, he attempts to warn his neighbours of the danger approaching them but these are dismissed. Some regard him as disturbed, others as seeking attention, while many simply refuse to believe that events so extraordinary could intrude upon the security of their everyday lives. The community continued its accustomed existence, reassured by the apparent stability of its surroundings, until the machinery of persecution eventually arrived.
The historical circumstances of Wiesel’s account are unique, and its enduring political lesson, however, concerns the vulnerability of societies that dismiss warnings about the erosion of institutional safeguards. The danger is not always immediately visible in the destruction of constitutional arrangements. It may emerge through the gradual subordination of institutions intended to protect the public to interests that those institutions were never established to serve. This is the context in which allegations of political influence over Guyana’s security sector deserve examination and the constitutional relationship between the executive, the Disciplined Forces and the population whose liberties those forces are entrusted to protect.
Article 197A of Guyana’s Constitution establishes the obligations of the defence and security forces, including their allegiance to the Constitution and the nation. The Police Force is identified as the State’s law-enforcement agency, responsible for maintaining law and order in accordance with the law. Its constitutional purpose is the protection of citizens, rather than the preservation of the political authority of any administration. The distinction between the State and the government therefore becomes fundamental. Governments exercise temporary authority through electoral mandates. The institutions of the State possess continuing legal responsibilities that transcend changes in political administration. When those distinctions become obscured, public institutions become susceptible to advancing partisan interests rather than discharge their statutory functions.
In June 2021, then Minister of Home Affairs Robeson Benn disclosed that legislation was being developed to establish a Regional Joint Support Team, incorporating personnel from the Joint Services. The proposed arrangement was presented as an initiative to strengthen law enforcement, particularly in the interior regions. Questions nevertheless arose concerning its command structure, legal authority and relationship with the existing Police Force. President Irfaan Ali rejected suggestions that the initiative would constitute a parallel police force, maintaining that it would supplement established security institutions. Yet the proposal raised an important constitutional question: while the legislation was intended to add an additional organisation exercising policing powers, there were no accompanying legislation as to whom its personnel would ultimately be accountable to. These questions acquire particular significance when considered alongside the revelations arising from the controversy involving Opposition Leader Azruddin Mohamed.
During extradition proceedings in September 2026, Senior Superintendent Prem Narine, Head of the Guyana Police Force’s Special Branch, acknowledged under cross-examination that he had initiated surveillance of Mohamed without instructions from political superiors. He further testified that he had not submitted reports concerning that surveillance to his superiors. Narine rejected the defence’s allegation that his actions were politically directed. His testimony nevertheless presents an institutional question of considerable importance. How could intelligence resources be deployed against a prominent political figure without a clearly documented authorisation and reporting process? What constitutional or legal instruments governed the surveillance? Which Act or legislation established their purpose, duration and necessity? And what mechanisms existed to prevent the improper use of intelligence capabilities?
The matter becomes more consequential when considered alongside Narine’s testimony that operational notebooks containing records associated with the Mohameds’ arrests had been shredded and burned. Narine described the destruction as consistent with his understanding of security obligations, while questions arose concerning the legal authority and procedures governing the disposal of those records. The preservation of intelligence records is fundamental to institutional accountability. Without reliable records, the legality of surveillance operations and the decisions taken by public officers become increasingly difficult to reconstruct or independently examine.
The events on October 12 involving Narine and Mohamed introduced further questions about the exercise of lawful authority. Narine acknowledged discharging his service firearm towards a vehicle carrying Mohamed; the police subsequently alleged that a firearm had been discharged from that vehicle; access to recordings held by the Police Command Centre exposed another institutional vulnerability whose procedures for preserving, accessing and disclosing evidence are essential to public accountability. Maintaining that unauthorised access to sensitive recordings threatens the integrity of law-enforcement operations is one side of a complex legal argument; that argument does not however exclude protecting original evidence, maintaining auditable records and ensuring that relevant material can be examined through lawful judicial processes.
In political science, state capture describes circumstances in which public institutions and their decision-making processes become subordinated to particular interests, compromising their obligation to serve the broader public. Applied to the security sector, the relevant indicators include politically influenced interferences with their concomitant risks to citizens regardless of their political affiliations. The Mohamed affair presents an institutional test about the supervision of intelligence operations, the handling of police evidence, the impartiality of investigations and the independence of officers exercising significant coercive authority all of which directly confronts Guyana’s constitutional authority.
The immediacy of constitutional danger then arises when these questions are dismissed merely because the person affected is politically controversial. The presumption of innocence, protection against arbitrary detention and entitlement to fair proceedings are not privileges reserved only for persons who enjoy public sympathy. They are limitations imposed upon the State precisely because the powers of investigation, arrest and prosecution are capable of misuse. What Wiesel’s Night offered was a warning about the consequences of failing to examine disturbing evidence while established institutions continue to create an appearance of normality. Democratic decline may be obscured by the continuing operation of Parliament, the holding of elections and the routine administration of public affairs. The decisive consideration is whether those institutions retain the independence and authority necessary to constrain those exercising power. And it is here where the judiciary is the final bulwark in that framework.
Article 122A of the Constitution expressly guarantees judicial independence from political, executive and other forms of direction and control. Its importance becomes especially pronounced when disputes arise between citizens and the institutions entrusted with the coercive authority of the State. The essential warning is therefore not that authoritarianism has already displaced constitutional government in Guyana, but that its prevention depends upon the continued effectiveness of institutional restraints.
When executive authority expands, when security institutions face allegations of political influence and when the independence of criminal investigations is questioned, the judiciary must remain nested among the other constitutional guardrails such as the media against authoritarianism. The judiciary must remember its authority to restrain unlawful state action is not a concession granted by those who govern. It is an essential protection for the governed, and one upon which the survival of constitutional democracy ultimately depends.
Discussion