The allegations against Deputy Commissioner Fazil Karimbaksh, head of the Special Organised Crime Unit, confront Guyana with a test of constitutional government. The police have acknowledged a report alleging rape and threatening behaviour against a senior officer, while Home Affairs Minister Oneidge Walrond has publicly identified Karimbaksh and supported administrative leave pending investigation. These allegations remain unproven. Their seriousness nevertheless requires an institutional response that is prompt, lawful and demonstrably impartial.
The Constitution is sacrosanct in the exercise of public power. Article 8 establishes it as Guyana’s supreme law, against which inconsistent legislation must yield. Its authority binds the government, the police and every public official. Constitutional supremacy demands obedience even when its requirements are inconvenient, politically uncomfortable or directed towards someone occupying a powerful office.
Public servants are entrusted with powers belonging to the state. They must exercise those powers within the law and submit to lawful scrutiny of their conduct. For police officers, this obligation carries particular weight: their authority includes investigating citizens, restricting liberty and using force in legally defined circumstances. The public must therefore be confident that the same institution will investigate allegations against its own leadership without allowing rank to confer preferential treatment.
While Mr Karimbaksh is entitled to the presumption of innocence and a fair process the complainant must be entitled to protection, respectful treatment and a serious examination of her report. Both these obligations must operate together. A properly authorised, proportionate decision to place an officer on administrative leave is intended to protect an investigation without deciding guilt. Its purpose, legal basis and conditions should therefore be clearly explained, with all of its appropriate reviews.
The absence of a functioning Police Service Commission, which falls within the purview of the President, makes the matter more troubling. Minister Walrond has cited that absence when discussing who should authorise leave. Article 212, subject to Article 211(1), places disciplinary control over officers at or above the rank of inspector in the Commission and provides for delegation of powers. The precise authority for any interim measure must therefore be established through the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions. Ministerial preference alone cannot supply it.
Yet constitutional fidelity also requires maintaining the institutions through which accountability operates. An unconstituted commission should trigger urgent completion of the lawful appointment process and a clear explanation of available interim safeguards. Citizens should not have to discover, when a serious complaint arises, that an essential oversight mechanism is unavailable. The authorities owe the public both an apology and an account of why this gap was allowed to occur and how it will be prevented.
Other jurisdictions offer useful examples, although none provides a flawless model. In Ontario, Canada, the Special Investigations Unit is a civilian agency independent of the police. Within its statutory jurisdiction, it investigates allegations of sexual assault involving police officers and other specified officials. Its existence demonstrates that serious allegations against law-enforcement personnel can be investigated through a legally empowered body outside their ordinary command structure.
England provides both a warning and an accountability example. The David Carrick case exposed serious failures in responding to allegations against a serving Metropolitan Police officer who was subsequently convicted of sexual offences. The Independent Office for Police Conduct examined how earlier reports had been handled, including possible failures by other officers. Some resulting in misconduct allegations were not proven; separate failures attracted disciplinary consequences. The lesson concerns institutional accountability as well as individual offending: those responsible for receiving and investigating complaints must themselves remain answerable for their decisions.
There is no single worldwide procedure governing every public office. There are, however, well-established international benchmarks. The OECD’s public-integrity framework or Nolan’s Principles calls for clear standards, priority for the public interest, management of conflicts and enforceable accountability. The Nolan Principles similarly emphasise selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership. These standards require institutions capable of applying their rules to senior officials as consistently as to junior employees.
Guyana must translate those principles into working safeguards. It needs functioning constitutional commissions, protected reporting channels, specialist handling of sexual-offence complaints, evidence-preservation procedures and effective protection against retaliation. Investigators’ reporting arrangements should place them beyond the accused officer’s influence. Public updates should explain the process while protecting the complainant’s identity, confidential evidence and the fairness of any eventual proceedings.
A transparent, lawful investigation would demonstrate the capacity to confront a serious complaint. An opaque or compromised process would invite broader doubts.
The strongest reason for meeting these standards remains the rights of Guyanese citizens. The complainant deserves a protected and credible process; Mr Karimbaksh deserves a fair determination; the public deserves institutions whose authority survives scrutiny. The Constitution must govern each of those obligations. Guyana will show respect for its supreme law through the independence, competence and fairness of the response it now delivers.
Discussion