In our last week’s column, we began a discussion of the role of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) in the accountability process. We stated that the accountability cycle does not end with the tabling of the Auditor General’s report in the National Assembly and that two other important steps are needed to close the loop: (i) the PAC’s scrutiny of the public accounts and reporting of its findings and recommendations to the Assembly; and (ii) the issuing of a Treasury Memorandum setting out the actions the Government has taken or proposes to take in relation to the Committee’s report.
The PAC is now six years in arrears in its examination of and reporting on the public accounts. Considering this, it is indeed very disappointing to learn that last week’s four scheduled meetings of the newly formed PAC had to be cancelled because of the absence of government members. This attitude has been a pattern since the Assembly approved of a quorum change in April 2022 from three members to five members: two from the Government’s side, two from the Opposition, and the chairperson. According to the newly elected chairperson, Mr. Vishnu Panday:
The Government members’ reluctance to respond positively tells us that the affairs of proper governance are compromised. This attitude surely gives rise to suspicion, since the public cries out frequently on corruption by government officials. I am calling on them to attend all business meetings by fulfilling their obligations to the citizens of this country, who are their paymasters, so that the public affairs of this country can be carried out with efficiency and transparency.
The previous PAC chairperson, Jermaine Fugueira, under whose tenure the amendment was approved, had stated that the constant cancellations of meetings were frustrating as the work of the Committee continued to be stymied by one side of the House:
This constant cancellation is getting annoying. No one showed up from the government side…This is time wasting, our time, the staff time, the advisors and the agency…Commitment to transparency and accountability is left with a question mark behind it. It is just so frustrating that this is what we have to go through.
Another previous PAC member had also argued that the Committee’s work should not be held up at the whims and fancies of a government; and that Accounting Officers were not receiving the desired guidance from the PAC, resulting in a repetition of the issues in subsequent years.
We also pointed out that there are two other responsibilities that are vested constitutionally/legislatively on the PAC. The first relates to its role in identifying and recommending to the Assembly five persons to sit on the Public Procurement Commission (PPC). The second is the oversight role the Committee plays in relation to the work of the Audit Office, including approving the work plan and budget of that office and the ratification of senior appointments. The first was dealt with in last week’s article. In today’s article, we discuss the PAC’s oversight role of the Audit Office.
Some background information
Prior to the constitutional amendments of 2001 and the passing of the Audit Act 2004, the Audit Office was part of the Executive Branch of the Government. It was only the Auditor General, by virtue of the constitutionality of his/her position, who was independent of the Government. In particular, the Ministry of Finance controlled the Audit Office’s budget, and budget submissions were subject to unilateral cuts. Additionally, the Auditor General did not have control over staffing; and all recruitment, promotion, transfer, and disciplinary actions were the responsibility of the Public Service Commission.
It was evident that such a practice did not augur well for the efficient and effective functioning of the Audit Office as the watchdog of public accountability. The Audit Office, it is to be noted, is responsible for the monitoring of the execution of the national budget on behalf of the Legislature to ascertain the extent to which expenditure is incurred in accordance with the intent of Parliament and whether there was due regard to economy, efficiency and effectiveness and in compliance with applicable laws, regulations and circular instructions.
Since the early 1990s, I drew to the attention of the authorities this unsatisfactory feature of the work of the Audit Office. I argued that the Audit Office should be given greater autonomy and flexibility to enable it to effectively discharge my constitutional mandate, through the delinking of it from the rest of the Public Service via constitutional and legislative amendment. When I discussed the matter with the then Head of the Presidential Secretariat, the late Dr. Roger Luncheon, he argued that my proposal would result in too much power being vested in me. He wanted a guarantee that I would not abuse my authority.
Placing the Audit Office under parliamentary oversight
During the 2000 Constitutional Review Committee, the late Dr. Rupert Roopnaraine and another member of the Commission met with me. I proposed that the Constitution be amended in three areas. The first relates to the amendment to Article 118 to remove the Auditor General from membership of the Cabinet Sub-Committee on Finance on the ground that the oversight responsibility of the Auditor General placed him in situation of conflict of intertest. Second, Article 223 (3) be amended to provide for the Auditor General to submit his report to the Speaker of the Assembly, rather than to the Minister of Finance, to avoid the perception that there was a reporting relationship to the Minister.
Perhaps the most important proposed amendment relates to what constitutes the public accounts of Guyana. I suggested that Article 223 (8) provide a definition of the public accounts to include: (i) all central and local government bodies and entities; (ii) all bodies and entities in which the State has a controlling interest; and (iii) all projects that are financed by way of loans or grants by any foreign state or entity. Additionally, in order to address Dr. Luncheon’s concern about possible abuse of authority, I proposed that Article 223 include a provision for the PAC to exercise oversight of the work and operations of the Audit Office in accordance with a Policies and Procedures Manual approved by the PAC. The rationale for placing the Audit Office under parliamentary oversight is that since the Auditor General reports to the Assembly, it is that body, via the PAC, that should exercise oversight of the work of the Audit Office.
I was glad that all my suggestions for constitutional amendment were accepted, including the requirement for the Auditor General to submit quarterly reports to the PAC as well as an independent auditor’s report on the accounts of the Audit Office. According to the Audit Office’s website, the last set of audited accounts was in respect of 2022. The Audit Office is therefore three years in arrears in terms of financial reporting and audit. That apart, it is unclear whether the audited accounts as well as quarterly reports were presented to the PAC. The Constitution specifically refers to an annual systems and financial audit report, but from all appearances there is no evidence of a systems audit being undertaken. The latter is an important review procedure to ensure strict compliance with the Audit Act and its related Regulations, and the Audit Office’s Rules, Policies and Procedures Manual, considering the enormous powers vested in the Auditor General. There are reports that all is not well as regards the functioning of the Audit Office.
Audit Act 2004
The constitutional amendments referred to above had to be backed by legislation. At the time, the Audit Office was the beneficiary of a grant from the Inter-American Development Bank, and opportunity was taken to recruit a consultant to draft the related legislation. When the PAC met in December 2003 to discuss the draft, it was unhappy with its contents. I was invited to the meeting and offered to rework the documents. The Committee accepted my offer, and I produced a completely new draft. However, the Administration made several adjustments, including the unfortunate removal of the limitation of tenure of office of the Auditor General as well as his/her qualification requirements. The present Auditor General regrettably is not a qualified accountant, has served 21 years in the position so far, and was due to retire last March, having attained the retirement age of 68. However, he has been given approval to continue for an additional two years, the circumstances of which are unclear.
The Audit Act was passed in April 2004 at a time when I was attached to the UN Peacekeeping Operations in Africa. It was made operational in April 2005, four months after I demitted office. By Section 40, the expenditure of the Audit Office shall be a direct charge on the Consolidated Fund, determined as a lump sum by way of an annual subvention approved by the Assembly after review and approval of the Audit Office’s budget as a part of the process of the determination of the national budget.
The Auditor General is required to prepare and submit to the PAC an annual budget for the Audit Office, supported by work plans and programmes. The Committee reviews the submission and provides comments for consideration by the Auditor General after which the latter makes a revised submission to PAC for endorsement. The budget is then forwarded to the Minister of Finance for inclusion in the overall annual budget proposals as a subvention to the Audit Office within the allocations of the Parliament Office. Considering that the last meeting of the PAC was on 24 March 2025, it is unclear what procedures were followed as regards the 2026 budget for the Audit Office.
Additionally, in accordance with Section 14(3), the Auditor General’s appointment and discipline of all senior officers and senior employees shall be subject to approval by the PAC.
Discussion