Dear Editor,
The reported reasons for refusing Azruddin Mohamed bail deserve sharper constitutional scrutiny. What reliable information makes continued imprisonment necessary, and why would strict, enforceable conditions be inadequate? The presumption of innocence cannot be ignored or glossed over.
Mohamed’s continued detention may affect several fundamental rights, particularly personal liberty, the presumption of innocence, a fair and timely hearing, effective legal representation, and humane treatment.
The breaches can be profound, and implicate constitutional guarantees afforded to everyone: Personal liberty: Article 139(1); Release when trial does not occur within a reasonable time: Article 139(4); Presumption of innocence: Article 144(2)(a); Fair, timely and impartial hearing: Article 144(1); Judicial independence: Article 122A; Access to counsel and defence preparation: Articles 139(3), 144(2)(c)–(e); Protection against inhuman or degrading treatment: Article 141(1); Equality before the law and equal protection: Article 149D; Expression, assembly and association: Articles 146–147; Freedom of movement: Article 148; Protection of life: Article 138; Constitutional redress: Article 153.
Equality before the law and political freedoms may also be engaged. The essential distinction is between a right being restricted by detention and that restriction becoming unconstitutional.
The High Court’s November 18, 2026 dismissal of his challenge leaves the magistrate’s refusal of bail in force. However, the reported judgment permits renewed applications where disclosure, changed circumstances or proposed conditions undermine the justification for continued custody.
Article 154A also recognizes rights under specified international treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights-ICCPR. Those protections reinforce the analysis, subject to the Constitution’s qualifications and enforcement framework. In interpreting the Covenant, the UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 35, paragraph 38, requires an individual assessment of whether detention is necessary and examination of alternatives. It specifically rejects vague, expansive appeals to public security as sufficient standards. Invoking national security cannot relieve a court of explaining the actual risk.
These protections all govern the exercise of judicial discretion. Although they permit lawful detention before trial, they require more than an assertion that imprisonment serves the public interest, or reliance upon discredited evidence of the pending charges relied upon to justify the callous refusal of bail.
The High Court’s November 18 dismissal found no sufficient ground to overturn the magistrate’s decision through judicial review. Respect for the judgment does not prohibit reasoned criticism of the published explanation or further examination of whether detention remains necessary.
The central weakness remains the inference drawn from an alleged pattern. Magistrate Gibbs acknowledged that the pending charges were unproven, yet relied on their proximity when predicting further offending. Several counts arising from the connected October 12–13 events do not automatically establish several independent episodes of criminal behaviour. The alleged acquisition of footage was a distinct act, but its significance requires separate assessment. If multiplying charges were sufficient to establish a propensity to offend, constitutional liberty would become hostage to prosecutorial charging decisions-however weaponized or perverse they may be.
Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Bail Act requires a substantial basis for predicting further offending of the specified kind. Section 7(2) requires consideration of liberty and the prejudice of detention alongside society’s interests. Society also has an interest in protecting innocent people from unnecessary imprisonment. A balancing exercise that inadequately explains that side of the balance is unpersuasive.
Sections 11–12 of the Bail Act provide for conditions addressing attendance, further offending and interference with justice. Why would restrictions on direct or indirect witness contact, approaches to relevant police personnel, and improper access to protected information be insufficient, alongside reporting and travel restrictions? Conditions must preserve lawful defence work through counsel. The published reasons do not convincingly explain why such safeguards would fail.
Article 144(2)(c) also protects the ability to prepare a defence. Where footage or other defence material directly weakens the conduct relied upon to predict further offending, it deserves consideration in assessing bail. A hearing need not determine guilt to assess information fairly. Treating the prosecution’s account as sufficient for detention while dismissing materially relevant defence explanations would produce a dangerously one-sided assessment. This argument does not confer immunity for any independently established offence in obtaining footage.
The Government’s October 13 statement compounds the concern. It described its account as “uncontroverted facts” and Mohamed’s companions as “henchmen”, while acknowledging an ongoing investigation. The executive should not announce certainty where the courts must determine disputed facts. Such language deserves condemnation as premature prejudgment and prejudice. Universal Human Rights concerns expressly identifies a duty on public authorities to avoid statements affirming an accused person’s guilt before adjudication.
Article 122A requires judicial independence from political and executive control. Government denunciations cannot supply an evidential foundation for detention.
Article 149D guarantees equality before the law and equal protection. That principle demands impartial scrutiny of allegations concerning police officers as well as Mohamed. All relevant recordings should be preserved and examined, and credible allegations concerning Prem Narine’s conduct independently investigated. Political office creates no immunity, and police office creates no entitlement to unquestioning acceptance.
The cumulative sequence of proceedings, executive denunciations and detention warrants scrutiny for selective enforcement and political misuse of state power. It does not, by itself, prove persecution. But detention of the Opposition Leader affects parliamentary representation and public confidence, making transparent justification and prompt reconsideration especially urgent.
I therefore support a renewed bail hearing on the current evidence, unless it is clear that the Court is intractable for whatever reason, in which event the Court of Appeal must review these troubling decisions, focused on Mohamed’s bail rights and release under carefully drawn conditions-as they would apply to any other person. The Court must also explain why specified conditions cannot address the identified risks.
Constitutional rights must constrain the exercise of power. The State must justify detention; an accused person must not be required to establish innocence, nor must his/her political affiliation determine his right to liberty, due process or his right to freedom of movement in his own country.
Yours faithfully,
Hon. Albert Baldeo
Former Magistrate and Senior State Counsel, Guyana
Community Leader and Judicial Delegate (NY)
President, ONE GUYANA, BEYOND BORDERS (NY)
Discussion