-Business and Economic Commentary by Christopher Ram
The renewed calls for the substantive appointment of Guyana’s Chancellor and Chief Justice are understandable, given the prolonged reliance on acting appointments to fill the Judiciary’s two highest offices. While this constitutional impasse ought to be resolved, the concentration on confirmation overlooks more fundamental problems of judicial performance, management and accountability. Even if both acting officeholders were confirmed tomorrow, there is little reason to believe that such appointments, without accompanying reforms, would significantly improve the administration of justice.
Over recent years, the Judiciary has benefited from additional judges, improved facilities, electronic filing, virtual hearings and other modernisation initiatives, while the Civil Procedure Rules introduced in 2017 were intended to improve the efficiency of civil litigation. These developments are welcome, but increased resources must ultimately be judged by results rather than by expenditure or the number of appointments.
The Judiciary’s own statistics raise disturbing questions. Page 30 of its 2023 Annual Report records that the Demerara Judicial Registry’s clearance rate for Statements of Claim fell from 54.8% in 2021 to 4.7% in 2023, while the rate for Fixed Date Applications declined from 88.3% in 2022 to 25.4% in 2023. In actual numbers, Statements of Claim concluded fell from 204 in 2021 to just 16 in 2023, while Fixed Date Applications concluded declined from 1,653 in 2022 to 486 in 2023.
The Court of Appeal presents an equally concerning picture, with page 26 of the same report recording 361 matters filed in 2023 but only 163 disposed of, representing a ratio of disposals to new filings of approximately 45%, compared with 76% in 2021. These are not allegations by dissatisfied litigants but figures published by the Judiciary itself, which require explanation and, where necessary, corrective action.
There may be explanations involving changes in reporting methodology, staffing or case classification, but the Judiciary should provide them, together with comparable information for 2024 and 2025. The public is also entitled to know the number and age of outstanding cases, the duration of reserved judgments and the measures being taken to reduce delays. Judicial independence protects judges against interference in deciding cases; it does not exempt the administration of the courts from scrutiny.
The temporary appointments of Justices Arif Bulkan and Rafeek Khan demonstrated the contribution that experienced and productive judges can make to reducing outstanding work, suggesting that the issue is not simply the number of judges but how effectively judicial resources are deployed.
The Judiciary enjoys constitutional financial and administrative autonomy under Articles 122A and 222A, including funding through a direct charge on the Consolidated Fund, while Article 223 requires the Auditor General to audit the accounts of all courts. Financial independence is essential, but it cannot become an exemption from accountability.
The Supreme Court’s 2022 Annual Report records approximately G$3.59 billion in funding and G$3.20 billion in expenditure, supported by financial schedules but without an identifiable accompanying independent audit opinion. The Auditor General’s 2024 Annual Report identifies completed audits of the Supreme Court’s financial statements for 2015, 2016 and 2017, without identifying corresponding audits for subsequent years. The obvious questions are whether later financial statements were prepared and audited, and where the resulting reports may be examined.
Reporting has also been delayed, with the 2022 Annual Report laid before the National Assembly in January 2024 and the 2023 report not laid until November 2025. Reports for 2024 and 2025 are not currently listed on the Judiciary’s website.
As an officer of the court, I regard judicial independence as indispensable, but the Judiciary cannot insist that other public authorities comply with the law and account for public funds while treating its own obligations as secondary. Having more money is no substitute for proper financial management.
Article 127 requires agreement between the President and the Leader of the Opposition for substantive appointments, but acting officeholders acquire no automatic entitlement to confirmation. Appointments to the Judiciary’s highest offices should follow a transparent, merit-based process assessing legal competence, integrity, experience, administrative ability, demonstrated leadership and a commitment to meaningful judicial reform, rather than treating incumbency as sufficient qualification.
The claims of other qualified candidates deserve consideration. Justice Deo Rishi Persaud was appointed to the High Court in 2004 and to the Court of Appeal in 2017, whereas the present acting Chief Justice, Navindra Singh, was appointed to the High Court in 2012 and to the Court of Appeal in 2025. These differences do not automatically determine who should be appointed, but they demonstrate why confirmation should not be treated as a foregone conclusion. Neither seniority nor incumbency should replace a proper assessment of merit.
The constitutional appointments impasse should certainly be resolved, but its resolution must not be mistaken for judicial reform. If the acting Chancellor and Chief Justice were confirmed tomorrow, outstanding cases would remain outstanding, reserved judgments would still require delivery, and the questions surrounding judicial performance and financial accountability would remain unanswered.
The fundamental problem is not the absence of substantive titles but the need for effective leadership, efficient judicial administration and meaningful accountability. Unless these deficiencies are addressed, confirmation is unlikely to produce any significant improvement in the delivery of justice.
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